Jeffrey Cutler v. Amber Green by unknown
2018 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-30-2018 
Jeffrey Cutler v. Amber Green 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018 
Recommended Citation 
"Jeffrey Cutler v. Amber Green" (2018). 2018 Decisions. 935. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018/935 
This October is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2018 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 17-2709 
____________ 
 
JEFFREY CUTLER, East Lampeter Township 
Elected Tax Collector, 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
AMBER GREEN; RALPH HUTCHINSON; 
SELECTED PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC OFFICIALS, 
Both Elected and Non-Elected, et al; JUDGE MARGARET 
MILLER; CHRISTINA HAUSNER; RON MARTIN; WGAL 
 __________________________________  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-17-cv-00984) 
District Judge: Honorable Thomas N. O’Neill, Jr. 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 15, 2018 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., BIBAS and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 30, 2018) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
Jeffrey Cutler appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his amended 
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm. 
 Cutler was East Lampeter Township’s elected tax collector.1  As the Tax 
Collector, Cutler collects taxes from Township property owners for municipal taxes owed 
to both the Township and Lancaster County.  After an audit could not be completed, the 
Township sought to meet with Cutler to correct certain of his records-keeping 
deficiencies.  When those informal efforts failed, in June 2015, an action in mandamus 
was filed against Cutler by the Township in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster 
County, Pennsylvania, East Lampeter Township v. Jeffrey Cutler, No. CI-15-05424.  In 
that action, the Township asked the Court to compel Cutler to comply with the local tax 
collection laws, 72 P.S. § 5511.1, et seq.  The mandamus petition alleged, in pertinent 
part, that Cutler had failed to appoint a deputy tax collector and keep accurate accounts 
and records for tax years 2014 and 2015.  Following a March 17, 2017 hearing,2 
Common Pleas Judge Margaret C. Miller issued an order requiring Fulton Bank to freeze 
                                              
1 Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts, procedural 
history, and allegations, we will not recite them except as necessary to our discussion. 
 
2 At that hearing, Brian Hurter, Lancaster County Controller, and Ralph Hutchison, East 
Lampeter Township Manager, testified about Cutler’s alleged mishandling of his duties 
as Tax Collector and that the Township had adopted a resolution naming the County 
Treasurer as the Tax Collector for 2017. 
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Cutler’s Tax Collector Account, enjoining Cutler from performing any duties as Tax 
Collector for East Lampeter Township, and requiring him to deliver all books and records 
associated with his tax collection duties to the Lancaster County Controller.  Lancaster 
County Treasurer, Amber Green, was installed as Interim Tax Collector.  On March 27, 
2017, Judge Miller issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a decision and order 
granting mandamus relief. 
 In the meantime, on March 3, 2017, Cutler filed an “Emergency Petition of 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Summary Judgment and Motion to 
Combine Cases” in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  He then filed an amended complaint against Judge Miller, Green, 
Hutchinson, Lancaster County Solicitor Christina Hausner, Ron Martin – WGAL, and 
certain unidentified Pennsylvania public officials.  Cutler alleged in his amended 
complaint that the defendants conspired to remove him from office and otherwise 
interfere with his duties as the duly-elected Tax Collector of East Lampeter Township, in 
violation of his constitutional rights under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
and the rights of the public.  Cutler asked the District Court to, among other things, 
vacate Judge Miller’s order in the state mandamus action.  Cutler also filed a motion to 
“combine” certain cases, a motion for summary judgment, and a motion for a default 
judgment against the identified and unidentified defendants who did not answer or 
respond to his amended complaint. 
The District Court denied Cutler’s request for emergency relief.  Defendants 
Hutchinson, Judge Miller, and Green and Hausner then moved separately to dismiss 
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Cutler’s amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing 
several bases for dismissal, including that the Younger abstention doctrine, see Younger 
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), should apply and prevent the District Court from 
interfering in the ongoing state enforcement proceedings.  After the issues were fully 
briefed, the District Court, in an order entered on July 11, 2017, granted the defendants’ 
motions and dismissed the amended complaint.  The Court held that the mandamus action 
was a civil enforcement proceeding against Cutler, and that he had not shown that any of 
the exceptions to Younger applied to make abstention improper.  The Court further held 
that, even if Younger did not bar Cutler’s claims in their entirety, they were not otherwise 
sufficient to withstand dismissal because they were not plausible.  The Court reasoned 
that Cutler was unable to state a claim for conspiracy because he alleged only “fantastic 
scenarios” lacking any arguable factual basis.  The District Court also denied Cutler’s 
motion for summary judgment, motion for a default judgment, and motion to “combine” 
certain cases.  In an order entered on July 21, 2017, the District Court denied Cutler’s 
timely filed motion for reconsideration, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). 
 Cutler  appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In his pro se brief, 
Cutler argues that the District Court erred when it classified the state proceeding in East 
Lampeter Township v. Jeffrey Cutler as a civil enforcement action and that the Court 
should not have abstained, Appellant’s Pro Se Brief, at 28-29.  Cutler also contends that 
the District Court wrongly denied his motions for summary judgment and for a default 
judgment, id. at 26-27, 31; and erred in refusing to consolidate his case with several 
others, id. at 35-37.  
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 We will affirm.  “We exercise plenary review over whether the requirements for 
abstention have been met.”  Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Under Younger, federal courts must abstain from adjudicating, and therefore dismiss 
claims otherwise within the scope of federal jurisdiction when “exceptional 
circumstances . . . justify a federal court’s refusal to decide a case in deference to the 
States.”  Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013) (internal 
quotation marks removed).  Those “exceptional circumstances” are found when the 
underlying state proceeding fits into one of three categories: (1) “state criminal 
prosecutions,” (2) “civil enforcement proceedings,” and (3) “civil proceedings involving 
certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their 
judicial functions.”  Id. at 588 (internal quotation marks removed).  Otherwise, federal 
courts should entertain and resolve on the merits an action within the scope of a 
jurisdictional grant.  Id.  See also New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of 
New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989). 
 In her motion to dismiss, Judge Miller argued that the mandamus action over 
which she presided falls under the second category of cases: civil enforcement 
proceedings.  The other moving defendants made the same argument.  The District Court 
agreed and so do we.  A civil enforcement proceeding exhibits one or more of the 
following characteristics: “(1) the action was commenced by the State in its sovereign 
capacity, (2) the proceeding was initiated to sanction the federal plaintiff for some 
wrongful act, and (3) there are other similarities to criminal actions, such as a preliminary 
investigation that culminated with the filing of formal charges.”  ACRA Turf Club, LLC, 
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v. Zanzuccki, 748 F.3d 127, 138 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Sprint Communications, 134 S. 
Ct. at 591).  Judge Miller contended that the mandamus action constituted a civil 
enforcement proceeding because it was initiated in response to Cutler’s alleged 
misconduct as the elected Tax Collector of East Lampeter Township, misconduct that 
was discovered as the result of an investigation into shortfalls in tax collection revenue 
and which resulted in the filing of a formal complaint against Cutler.   
We reject as unpersuasive Cutler’s unsupported argument that the District Court 
erred when it classified the state proceeding in East Lampeter Township v. Jeffrey Cutler 
as a civil enforcement action.  A Pennsylvania mandamus action exists to compel 
performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty.  See Rizzo v. Schmanek, 439 A.2d 
1296, 1297 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981).  Judge Miller concluded that Cutler failed to 
perform the duties of his office with respect to record-keeping, reporting and turning over 
tax money, and cooperating with the Township’s audit, in violation of 72 P.S. § 5511.25 
and § 5511.26.  Judge Miller specifically concluded that Cutler turned over tax money 
anywhere from one month to eight months late, and that he obstructed the lawful efforts 
of the Township to conduct an audit.  Under these circumstances, the Township’s 
mandamus action against Cutler fits comfortably within the class of cases identified in 
Sprint Communications, 134 S. Ct. at 592, as permitting abstention under Younger. 
 Having determined that the underlying proceeding was a civil enforcement 
proceeding, the District Court turned to the factors set forth in Middlesex County Ethics 
Comm’n v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982), for determining when a court 
should abstain under Younger.  Those factors are: (1) whether the proceeding is an 
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ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) whether the proceeding implicates important state 
interests; and (3) whether there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to 
raise federal constitutional challenges.  Id. at 432.  The District Court determined, and 
again we agree, that important state interests were implicated in the state proceeding 
regarding Cutler’s alleged misconduct as the Township Tax Collector, the state court 
matter was ongoing when he brought the civil action in federal court, and the state 
proceeding provided him with a sufficient opportunity to raise the claims which he 
asserts in this action.  Although Cutler contends in his brief on appeal that Judge Miller 
was biased and that the Township’s witnesses perjured themselves, he does not allege, 
nor does it appear, that he lacked sufficient opportunity to raise his due process concerns 
in the state action.   
Even where the Younger test is met, the District Court may interfere with a state 
proceeding in certain extraordinary circumstances, such as where irreparable injury is 
“both great and immediate,” where the state law is “flagrantly and patently violative of 
express constitutional prohibitions,” or where there is a showing of “bad faith, 
harassment, or ... other unusual circumstances that would call for equitable relief.”  
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 230 (1972) (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 46-54).  
Cutler failed to allege any plausible facts to show that this “extraordinary circumstances” 
exception should apply to his case.  Accordingly, abstention was proper and the District 
Court correctly dismissed the complaint as to all defendants to the extent that Cutler 
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asked the Court to vacate Judge Miller’s order in the case brought against him by East 
Lampeter Township.3  
 We further agree with the District Court that, even if Younger does not bar 
Cutler’s claims in their entirety, they were otherwise insufficient to withstand dismissal 
under Rule 12(b)(6).  A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the factual 
allegations contained in the amended complaint.  See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 
183 (3d Cir. 1993).  A motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff is unable to 
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  A claim is plausible when the facts alleged 
allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged.  See Burtch v. Millberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d. Cir. 2011).  
Although factual averments must be accepted as true, legal conclusions are disregarded.  
See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).   
A conspiracy cannot be inferred from the facts alleged in Cutler’s amended 
complaint.  “To properly plead an unconstitutional conspiracy, a plaintiff must assert 
facts from which a conspiratorial agreement can be inferred.”  Great Western Mining & 
Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing D.R. v. 
Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, 972 F.2d 1364, 1377 (3d Cir. 1992)).  
                                              
3 We agree with the District Court that, notwithstanding Rule 4(m), Fed. R. Civ. P., 
dismissal with prejudice of Cutler’s claims against the non-moving defendants who were 
not properly served was proper; the grounds raised by the moving defendants were 
common to all defendants and Cutler had an opportunity to respond to the moving 
defendants’ arguments.  In addition, the District Court properly denied Cutler’s motion 
for a default judgment because he failed to properly serve the nonresponding defendants.   
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“‘[M]erely resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not 
make [the winning] party a co-conspirator or joint actor with the judge.’”  Id. (quoting 
Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980)).  The “conspiracy” alleged by Cutler was, in 
fact, a lawful action in mandamus to compel him, as an elected official, to perform his 
duties as required by state and local law.  Accordingly, we uphold the dismissal of 
Cutler’s amended complaint, to the extent that Younger does not bar his claims in their 
entirety, as otherwise insufficient to withstand dismissal under Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
570.4 
 Last, Cutler’s motion to consolidate was properly denied.  Rule 42(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court may consolidate actions that 
“involve a common question of law or fact.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a).  Cutler failed to 
identify any common questions of law or fact between his action and the other actions he 
identified, or even provide a rational explanation for why his amended complaint should 
be consolidated with the other cases.  Those cases included, among other wholly 
unrelated cases, the criminal prosecution of Rufus Seth Williams, the former Philadelphia 
District Attorney, a mining action by BSG Resources against the billionaire George Soros 
for tortious interference with contract, and a class action against the Democratic National 
Committee for supporting Hilary Clinton.  Cutler’s motion for reconsideration was 
properly denied because he did not argue an intervening change in the law, new evidence, 
                                              
4 In view of the proper dismissal of Cutler’s amended complaint as to all defendants, his 
motion for summary judgment was moot and properly denied. 
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or a clear error of law.  See Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 
1999).   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the orders of the District Court 
dismissing Cutler’s amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and denying his motion 
for reconsideration.  Cutler’s “Motion for Directed Verdict to Vacate State Verdicts” is 
denied.  Appellees Green and Hauser’s motion to strike Cutler’s reply brief as untimely 
filed is denied and Cutler’s request, contained in a response to their motion, to extend the 
time to file his reply brief until December 6, 2017 is granted. 
 
